Reformers argue that taking redistricting authority away from state legislatures would make congressional elections more responsive and competitive. Yet in the past two House election cycles, every incumbent in New Jersey, Washington and Arizona won. Since Arizona's panel was created in 2000, the average margin of victory for House races has skyrocketed: In 2004 every district in the state was decided by a margin of more than 20 percentage points. New Jersey and Washington, where panels were first used after the 1990 Census, tell similar stories. By the end of the 1990s, average margins of victory in both states were just as high as before the advent of their independent commissions, and there was almost no partisan turnover.
The premise of this argument is that having a redistricting commission, by definition seeks to make elections more competitive. This is not so by any stretch of the imagination. In the three states cited by Rosenbaum, only Arizona has a mandate to seek competitive elections when presented with that possibility. However, such a mandate is very low on the list of criteria to be used.
Most states have redistricting criteria which states that the districts must be contiguous, i.e. not pockets of a district here and there, and preferably compact in shape. However, the very nature of human society tends to create pockets of like-minded voters as Rosenbaum notes
More important, political scientists now theorize that Americans are becoming increasingly segregated on the basis of partisanship. The more this is so, the more likely it is that compact, contiguous districts will inevitably produce safe seats for both parties, for reasons having nothing to do with gerrymandering.
Very true, the mere fact that incumbents are re-elected is not a direct result of redistricting, but rather the plethora of advantages incumbents have, from the fundraising edge to the favor of the media for incumbents. What needs to be done is to try and figure out ways to minimize the incumbent advantage. You can't eliminate it all together, but you can minimize it.
Whoever does the redistricting, polarization in Congress may be increasingly unavoidable. Reformers would do well to spend more time exploring the rise of the incumbency advantage and geographic polarization and less time lobbying for commissions that will have no effect on either of these trends.
Any redistricting plan that favors contiguity and compactness is likely to result in districts with overwhelming partisan proclivities. Not in all districts, mind you, but enough to generate landslide election results. but Rosenbaum does not discuss what can and needs to be done to correct the issue.
First, there needs to be a realization that the current method of contiguity and campactness runs counter to any stated intention to increase competitiveness. The very admission of political segregation means that unless you are willing to crack that "segregation" you are likely to end up with intensely partisan districts.
Second, the states and the courts would have to agree to a scheme in which continguity and compactness are sacrificed upon the altar of competitiveness. This would a difficult road to hoe under the best of circumstances. No redistricting criteria that does not favor competitive districts over any other criteria save contiguity is not likely to result in competitive districts.
Third, and most importantly, the DOJ needs to rethink its criteria for dealing with pre-clearance states. Under current rules, if a district has a certain percentage of minorities, i.e. blacks or Hispanics, it is almost impossible to reduce that percentage, even if there are significant demographic changes that would make such a change necessary.
Districting is the heart of the electoral process. The people on the side of the debate need to re-think their spin. An "independent" redistricting panel may eliminate the conflict of interest of the state legislature drawing lines, but unless properly instructed by the law, it is unlikely to produce competitive elections.
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