I haven't really talked about campaign finance and lobbying in a while. Part of it is simply a waning interest in the whole matter. But I do tend to get my nose out of shape when people give lobbyists a great deal of stick for being involved in campaign finance. Frankly I don't give a toss when people complain about special interests being so nefarious as to be corrupting the process. But I do expect people who are involved in politics to understand that lobbyists can contribute money just like anyone else.
So when I see something like this, it makes me happy.
Showing posts with label Lobbying. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lobbying. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Thursday, August 30, 2007
The Higher Education Lobby
Ben Adler, writing in the Washington Monthly lets readers in on the supposed "bad practices" of the higher education lobby. Ensconsed in a vey nice builiding in One Dupont Circle in Washington, DC, most of the prominent higher education associations benefit from the close quarters to become a large voice in the political process.
Adler describes this as if it were a bad thing for students and their parents.
In the modern age of lobbying coaltions are the norm if a groups wants to get anything done. Even mega groups like the United States Chamber of Commerce routine partner with smaller, even largely unknown, lobbying groups. Often, these large and small lobbying groups will be part of dozens of coalitions on a variety of issues. Given that higher education groups would often align on a whole series of issues, the close working relationship no doubt leads to a monolithic appearance--when they are on the opposite side of the table.
That these groups look out for the parochial interests of colleges and universities is not only to be expected--it is their entire reason for existence. But higher ed lobbies are a bit different that big coprorate trade associations and labor unions--they can't spend the money those groups can because of their legal status (one of the most important protections for colleges and universities is the 501(c)(3) status allowing for tax deductible contributions).
The fact of the matter is, that in the world of interest group politics, most people don't care about these issues. Adler speaks of legacy enrollment and early admission processes. For most Americans, this does not affect their lives directly and thus they don't care. When only one side has the microphone because the other side doesn't exist or show up, only one side gets heard.
Adler's article, while containing some interesting back room politicking a given issues, shows us nothing new or unexpected in the world of lobbying.
Adler describes this as if it were a bad thing for students and their parents.
That’s not to say that higher ed doesn’t champion righteous causes. In the 1990s, they stood up to attempts by the Republican Congress to cut student aid, and went on to team with the Clinton administration to expand the Pell Grant program. And when, after 9/11, the Bush administration, in its zeal to keep out terrorists, imposed overly harsh visa requirements that ended up keeping out large numbers of foreign professors and grad students—exactly the kind of people who keep our universities humming with fresh ideas—higher ed led the successful effort to pressure the government to adopt a more sensible policy.To a certain extent, it is a bad thing. But here is something to remember, the higher education lobby groups do not represent students, they represent colleges and universities and the various official groups like University Attorneys or University Presidents. These groups have members and interests that sometimes coincides with student intersts and sometimes don't.
But the same lobbying muscle they’ve often put in the service of worthy causes they’ve also used to thwart promising reforms. On a range of issues, higher ed has stood up for its own narrow strategic or pecuniary concerns, rather than the broader interests of students or the country at large. In short, though it represents institutions that loudly proclaim a mission of public service, the higher education lobby more often acts like any other Washington trade group. Today, one of the most significant roadblocks to fixing many of the pressing problems of our troubled system of higher education is the higher education lobby itself.
In the modern age of lobbying coaltions are the norm if a groups wants to get anything done. Even mega groups like the United States Chamber of Commerce routine partner with smaller, even largely unknown, lobbying groups. Often, these large and small lobbying groups will be part of dozens of coalitions on a variety of issues. Given that higher education groups would often align on a whole series of issues, the close working relationship no doubt leads to a monolithic appearance--when they are on the opposite side of the table.
That these groups look out for the parochial interests of colleges and universities is not only to be expected--it is their entire reason for existence. But higher ed lobbies are a bit different that big coprorate trade associations and labor unions--they can't spend the money those groups can because of their legal status (one of the most important protections for colleges and universities is the 501(c)(3) status allowing for tax deductible contributions).
The higher ed lobby is plenty aggressive, but in an understated way—money is not its main lever of power. In 2005, the last years for which figures are available, higher education associations officially spent just $6.2 million on lobbying, according to figures from Inside Higher Ed. (By contrast, General Electric alone spent $24.2 million, much of which went to the kind of high-priced outside law and PR firms that higher ed almost never employs.) Nor does it rely on mass grassroots campaigns to make its voice heard. Since most of the associations are organized under the tax code as 501(c)(3) organizations, they’re legally allowed to spend only a limited amount of money on the kind of conventional mass political tactics—holding rallies and organizing letter- and e-mail-writing campaigns in order to affect legislation—that the teachers unions or environmental groups routinely use.This is smart politics and very effective. But really, no different than any other group that seeks to influence policy.
Instead, higher ed wields power in two effective if subtle ways. First, it plays an inside game, conducting quiet, sit-down meetings with policy makers in which it trades on its expertise on the often technical questions of education policy. Hill staffers looking to make sense of complicated legislative proposals, and to understand the impact on those most directly affected, have little alternative but to turn to higher ed lobbyists.
Second, higher ed makes skillful use of its hometown ties. Colleges typically occupy prominent positions in the economic, cultural, and civic life of their communities, and they’re adept at using those positions to win influence. They can curry favor with legislators by conferring honorary degrees or inviting them to give commencement addresses, usually generating a round of positive PR back home. In some communities, college presidents are high-profile public figures, with ready access to the media and the power to help shape local opinion. Like large corporations, universities are often major employers in their districts, and their financial fortunes have a spillover effect on the local economy. More personal ties can also weigh heavily: according to some Hill staffers, legislators often have a soft spot for their alma mater, or for the state university whose football team they grew up rooting for.
The fact of the matter is, that in the world of interest group politics, most people don't care about these issues. Adler speaks of legacy enrollment and early admission processes. For most Americans, this does not affect their lives directly and thus they don't care. When only one side has the microphone because the other side doesn't exist or show up, only one side gets heard.
Adler's article, while containing some interesting back room politicking a given issues, shows us nothing new or unexpected in the world of lobbying.
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Lobbyists, "Bundling," and Congressional Ethics Reform
From the Politico:
But this part still cracks me up:
Take a little test, in teh above paragraph, substitute the word "wife, son, daughter, mother, father, neighbor or high school friend" for "lobbyist" and tell me what is wrong with "bundling." The answer, not a thing.
See bundling is just fundraising and that is no more illegal than watching a baseball game. But for some reason the fact that a lobbyist is doing it, somehow makes it more insidious. If a lobbyist asks a client to make a contribution to a candidate, the client can so no with impunity. The client holds the power in the relationship and could even fire the lobbyist for making the request. Teh fact that a lobbyist raises money for a candidate doesn't mean that lobbyist will ultimately have any more sway of the future lawmaker than the lawmaker's wife, son, daughter, mother, father, neighbor or high school friend and in fact will probably still have less.
But Congress wants a boogeyman and the lobbyist is the easiest one to abuse. The onus of this regulation is all on the lobbyist. So Congress can't really reform itself, it must turn outside of itself to save Congress. The burden of disclosing bundling could have just as easily been placed on the candidate (incumbent), but that means taking responsibility for the people a candidate uses to raise money.
Wow, imagine that, a Congressman taking responsibility for their own actions!! Were that the world we lived in.
It's a familiar backpedaling pattern emerging early in the new Democratic-controlled Congress. From lobbying reforms to anti-corruption proposals to curbing earmarks, Democratic lawmakers who railed against Republican corruption a year ago have flinched from imposing the harshest standards on themselves. Consequently, this Democratic Congress may end up no better prepared to police itself than the Republicans were when the Jack Abramoff bribery scandal broke and the spate of criminal convictions it spawned surfaced as a primary reason for voters' angst last fall.It comes as no surprise to me, the GOP when they took control in 1994, promised a whole series of reforms and changes. They did close the House bank, but the tough new gift rules got rolled back and interpreted in such a way as to permit a great deal. The fact that the Democrats are reluctant to impose restrictions on themselves can be explained by two words, "self interest."
But this part still cracks me up:
Indeed, the public may become increasingly dependent on the lobbyists to disclose the business of lawmakers. Why? The outsiders will face more serious consequences if they don't follow the law, including the threat of Justice Department investigations, than the incumbents. One measure coming to the House this week illustrates the point. It would require lobbyists to disclose how much money they've bundled in donations for campaigns. That provision provides insight into which lobbyists are closest to certain lawmakers. It also could provide the first accurate information on the subject.The term bundling, as it is used here, just generally makes me laugh.
Take a little test, in teh above paragraph, substitute the word "wife, son, daughter, mother, father, neighbor or high school friend" for "lobbyist" and tell me what is wrong with "bundling." The answer, not a thing.
See bundling is just fundraising and that is no more illegal than watching a baseball game. But for some reason the fact that a lobbyist is doing it, somehow makes it more insidious. If a lobbyist asks a client to make a contribution to a candidate, the client can so no with impunity. The client holds the power in the relationship and could even fire the lobbyist for making the request. Teh fact that a lobbyist raises money for a candidate doesn't mean that lobbyist will ultimately have any more sway of the future lawmaker than the lawmaker's wife, son, daughter, mother, father, neighbor or high school friend and in fact will probably still have less.
But Congress wants a boogeyman and the lobbyist is the easiest one to abuse. The onus of this regulation is all on the lobbyist. So Congress can't really reform itself, it must turn outside of itself to save Congress. The burden of disclosing bundling could have just as easily been placed on the candidate (incumbent), but that means taking responsibility for the people a candidate uses to raise money.
Wow, imagine that, a Congressman taking responsibility for their own actions!! Were that the world we lived in.
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